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LONG-RUN PERFORMANCE 
of backdoor-listed firms
Backdoor listings (BDL), in which a private firm achieves a listing status via the corporate shell 
of an already listed company, have been highly prevalent in capital markets around the globe 
including in Australia in recent decades. Evidence presented by Ferguson and Lam (2015) shows 
BDLs represent 13 per cent of all firms going public during the 1994–2014 period. Indeed, BDLs 
accounted for close to 30 per cent of all going-public transactions at the height of the global 
financial crisis in 2009, making them a real alternative to listing through the front door (via an 
initial public offering, IPO).
Despite their popularity, backdoor listings have been met with scepticism, and widely seen as 
being high risk and inferior in quality. For instance, the recent surge in high-tech BDL activity 
using the shells of failing junior explorers has attracted warnings from the corporate regulator.1 
Anecdotal evidence on the poor performance of backdoor-listed firms also abounds in the 
media, urging investors to be cautious.2 Empirical studies on the US market (e.g. Gleason 
et al. 2006; Adjei et al. 2008) and Canadian market (e.g. Carpentier et al. 2012) have found 
BDLs underperform their IPO counterparts in the aftermarket. They generally attribute this 
underperformance to the lax regulations and oversight over the backdoor listing process in 
those markets.
In contrast to other markets, Ferguson and Lam (2015) find the vast majority (roughly 75 per 
cent) of Australian BDLs are required by the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) to re-comply 
with the listing requirements, including Listing Rules Chapter 1 and 2 and a long-form prospectus, 
before the merged entity can be re-admitted to quotation. This unique regulatory setting makes 
backdoor listings in Australia very similar to the IPO process. Because of the more stringent 
requirement imposed on BDLs in Australia, it is conceivable that their aftermarket performance 
would be comparable to that of the front-door listed firms. After all, they also have to meet 
either the profit or asset test as their IPO counterparts do. This paper examines the long-run 
performance of ASX-listed BDLs to shed light on this issue.
Data and method
In defining backdoor listings, it is critical that the owners of the private firm gain control of the 
listed shell entity through a reverse takeover; otherwise, the transaction is merely a change in the 
nature or scale of the business of the shell (Brown et al. 2013). We adopt the same procedures as 
Ferguson and Lam (2015) in identifying an initial sample of completed BDLs over the 1994−2013 
period through newspaper search and examination of related corporate announcements made by 
the listed shell companies. Because of the need to examine long-run (three years) performance 
after listing, we exclude BDLs that were completed after December 2013. We further restrict 
our sample to firms in the non-financial sector as financial firms typically have distinctive 
We examine the long-run performance of a sample of firms going public through 
backdoor listing on the ASX during the 1994−2013 period. When benchmarked with 
a control sample of IPOs, backdoor-listed firms underperformed in the aftermarket. 
Over the three years after listing, they raised less equity capital and were less 
profitable and more financially distressed than their IPO counterparts. They also 
performed poorly in terms of buy-and-hold returns against the matched IPO firms 
and broad-based market indices. Our results tend to corroborate findings in the US 
and Canada but are inconsistent with their assertion that lax regulatory oversight 
is the major cause of underperformance since Australian backdoor listings have to 
comply with essentially the same listing requirements as IPOs.
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characteristics and financial statement items. Pooling them together with non-financial firms 
would render the interpretation of results difficult. Applying these procedures leaves a total of 
251 BDLs in our final sample. For benchmarking purposes, we construct a control sample of IPOs 
based on information available on the Connect4 database. Specifically, we match every BDL case 
in the sample with one IPO based on year of listing, industry sector (2-digit GICS code) and size 
(total assets).3
Table 1 presents the distribution of our BDL sample by year and industry sector. The annual 
number of non-financial BDLs has largely been maintained at double-digit figures over the 
20-year period, except for the earlier years before the dotcom era. The number peaked in 2000 
with a total of 29 BDLs in that year alone. By industry breakdown, Materials (20.3 per cent of 
all cases), Information Technology (18.3 per cent) and Health Care (13.5 per cent) are the three 
most popular sectors for backdoor listings while Utilities (0.4 per cent) and Consumer Staples 
(3.2 per cent) are the least popular. It is interesting to note while the Materials sector is the 
largest supplier of shells for technology companies to go public through the backdoor, it is also 
the largest user of shells in the backdoor-listing process.

















































































1994 0 2 2 1 0 0 1 2 0  8 (3.2%)
1995 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 0  5 (2.0%)
1996 0 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 0  5 (2.0%)
1997 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0  5 (2.0%)
1998 0 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 0  7 (2.8%)
1999 0 0 1 4 0 1 6 1 0  13 (5.2%)
2000 1 0 2 5 0 3 13 5 0  29 (11.6%)
2001 0 2 2 1 2 3 2 2 0  14 (5.6%)
2002 0 1 3 3 1 6 3 2 0  19 (7.6%)
2003 0 3 3 2 0 4 5 2 0  19 (7.6%)
2004 1 3 1 2 0 7 3 1 1  19 (7.6%)
2005 1 1 3 2 0 1 2 1 0  11 (4.4%)
2006 2 1 2 1 0 2 1 1 0  10 (4.0%)
2007 2 4 0 2 1 0 0 0 0  9 (3.6%)
2008 2 5 1 1 0 1 0 0 0  10 (4.0%)
2009 4 6 2 1 0 0 1 0 0  14 (5.6%)
2010 4 4 1 2 0 1 1 1 0  14 (5.6%)
2011 7 5 1 0 0 1 1 1 0  16 (6.4%)
2012 2 5 0 0 2 1 0 0 0  10 (4.0%)
2013 3 5 1 2 0 2 1 0 0  14 (5.6%)
All years 30 51 31 30 8 34 46 20 1 251
(12.0%) (20.3%) (12.4%) (12.0%) (3.2%) (13.5%) (18.3%) (8.0%) (0.4%) (100%)
To gauge their aftermarket performance, we examine four facets of these backdoor-listed 
firms, including their access to capital, operating performance, survival status, and stock 
market performance. Data on capital raisings and survival status are manually collected from 
Morningstar’s DatAnalysis database. Data on accounting variables for computing operating 
performance are retrieved from Morningstar’s Aspect Financials database, while stock price 
data are from the Share Prices and Price Relatives (SPPR) database of SIRCA.
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Access to capital
Companies need capital for growth and expansion. Being able to access the market for equity 
capital is one of the major reasons for private firms to go public. Since capital is relatively scarce, 
the ability of firms to attract capital can be used as a gauge of their underlying performance 
and future prospects as perceived by the market. Table 2 reports the aggregate access to 
equity capital by the sample of BDL firms in the three years following going public. Both the 
frequency and dollar amount of the capital raisings are reported, with details partitioned by the 
type of issue and year.4 For comparison purposes, similar data for the matched IPO sample is 
also reported.
At the time of the going-public transaction, BDL firms raised a lot less equity capital than their 
IPO counterparts. A total of 165 BDL firms (out of 251) conducted one or more forms of equity 
issue, raising aggregate cash proceeds of $1,468 million (an average of $5.8 million per firm). 
The median BDL firm raised $2.2 million at listing. By issue type, public offers ($692 million) and 
private placements ($663 million) are the predominant forms of capital raisings. Shareholders 
participated in 13 rights issues conducted by the BDL firms, contributing a total of $112 million. 
Two BDL firms also raised capital through share purchase plans ($0.7 million) from their existing 
shareholders. In contrast, 250 matched IPO firms raised an aggregate of $5,749 million from 
public offers at the time of going public,5 with average proceeds of approximately $22.9 million 
per offer and a median offer size of $10.5 million. This amount raised is roughly 3.9 times the total 
capital raised in BDL going-public transactions from all issue types.
Over the three-year period after listing, BDL firms seem more active in accessing capital, raising 
a total of $5,726 million as compared to $3,885 million by the matched IPO sample. Moreover, 
this difference in capital raising activity is mainly observed in the first year after going public. 
Counting all capital raised during the going-public transaction and the subsequent three years in 
the aftermarket, the BDL sample still raised less capital ($7,194 million) than the control sample 
of IPO firms ($9,634 million). By issue type, private placements made up close to 70 per cent 
of all proceeds raised by BDL firms, followed by rights issues (16.1 per cent) and public offers 
(12.2 per cent). For the matched IPO sample, public offers accounted for 60.9 per cent of all 
proceeds raised. Private placements are also a significant component of capital raisings for the 
IPO sample in subsequent years (31.6 per cent), with rights issues accounting for 5.5 per cent of 
all proceeds raised.
Overall, results suggest BDL firms tend to raise the bulk (42.5 per cent) of their equity capital in 
the year following their going-public transaction, predominately through private placements. In 
contrast, the matched IPO firms raised the majority of their proceeds (59.7 per cent) during their 
initial public offers. This evidence is consistent with the claim (e.g. Kuo and Humphrey 2002) that 
BDLs generally lack the publicity and marketing event associated with an IPO, making them less 
able to raise capital in the going public process.
9
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Operating performance
We employ two measures of firm size (market value of equity and total assets) and a total of 
eight accounting-based metrics to gauge the operating performance of BDL firms for up to three 
financial years after listing. Various performance attributes, including growth potential (MTB), 
profitability (ROA, ROE and NPM), balance sheet liquidity (CASH), leverage (LEV), retained 
earnings (RE) and financial distress (Altman’s Z-score), are explored. Market-to-book ratio (MTB) 
is measured as market capitalisation divided by book value of equity. Return on assets (ROA) 
is income before interest and tax divided by total assets. Return on equity (ROE) is net income 
divided by book value of equity. Net profit margin (NPM) is net income divided by sales revenue. 
CASH is cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets. LEV is total debt divided by total 
assets. RE is retained earnings divided by total assets. Altman’s Z-score is a proxy for financial 
distress, as discussed in Altman (1968).
Table 3 presents results on the operating performance of the backdoor-listed firms, along 
with the corresponding measures for the matched IPO sample. In almost all of the measures 
examined, the large discrepancy observed between the mean and median values indicates 
the distribution of these metrics is highly skewed and non-normal. Because of this reason, our 
analysis and inference are based primarily on the median value, instead of the mean, as the 
measure of central tendency for the two samples.
























Wilcoxon Z  
(6)
Panel A: Post-listing year 1
MVE ($m) 67.58 80.96 −0.55
17.19 21.81 −2.19**
Assets ($m) 79.26 70.42 1.20
19.76 20.79 −0.71
MTB 2.35 2.75 −0.55
1.12 1.44 −3.11***
ROA −2.94 −0.61 −0.96
−0.17 −0.07 −4.74***
ROE −1.27 −0.41 −1.38
−0.22 −0.08 −4.68***
NPM −65.45 −279.28 1.26
−0.95 −0.10 −2.73***
CASH 0.21 0.29 −3.66***
0.12 0.19 −3.52***
LEV 0.40 0.39 0.05
0.22 0.25 −0.08
RE −5.00 −1.26 −1.50
−0.73 −0.13 −7.54***
Altman's Z −4.82 9.58 −1.25
1.96 3.61 −3.31***
Panel B: Post-listing year 2
MVE ($m) 68.60 83.74 −0.99 −0.01 0.30 −0.13
14.09 20.62 −2.53** −0.24 0.43 −0.39
Assets ($m) 79.57 81.28 −0.20 −0.61 2.73*** −1.99**
18.10 21.84 −2.23** −2.23** 2.34** −2.76***
MTB 1.84 3.04 −1.06 −0.47 0.65 −0.74
1.22 1.39 −2.21** 0.20 −0.10 −0.51
ROA −30.64 4.06 −1.15 −0.93 0.90 −1.07
−0.18 −0.11 −2.16** −0.36 −3.90*** 1.56
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Wilcoxon Z  
(6)
Panel B: Post-listing year 2 (cont.)
ROE −2.734 4.43 −1.13 −1.19 0.90 −1.01
−0.27 −0.13 −2.36** −1.28 −4.09*** 0.90
NPM −45.22 −140.19 0.02 0.88 1.26 −0.85
−0.63 −0.22 −2.01** 2.40** −0.49 1.19
CASH 0.23 0.25 −1.43 0.70 −3.33*** 2.56**
0.12 0.18 −1.55 −0.90 −4.08*** 1.97**
LEV 3.08 0.76 1.09 1.32 0.91 1.08
0.25 0.27 1.36 4.32*** 4.02*** 1.37
RE −91.38 −5.06 −1.45 −1.45 −1.47 −1.39
−1.24 −0.31 −6.19*** −5.92*** −7.38*** −1.27
Altman's Z −214.29 17.67 −1.36 −1.23 0.47 −1.27
1.16 3.25 −3.80*** −3.16*** −2.99*** −1.01
Panel C: Post-listing year 3
MVE ($m) 69.82 102.11 −1.46 −0.18 2.28** −2.09**
13.03 19.70 −1.74* −0.38 0.18 −0.84
Assets ($m) 93.21 101.64 −0.55 1.95* 1.91* −0.59
17.84 20.76 −0.61 1.17 0.98 0.76
MTB 120.62 3.69 0.98 0.98 0.78 0.98
1.19 1.34 −2.32** −0.83 0.34 −1.19
ROA −2.38 −0.61 −0.49 0.95 −0.91 1.13
−0.17 −0.14 −1.07 −0.48 −3.00*** 1.41
ROE −0.07 −2.05 1.16 0.70 −1.23 1.26
−0.24 −0.17 −0.76 −0.70 −2.50** 0.43
NPM −194.48 −77.12 −1.03 −0.46 −0.54 −0.19
−0.48 −0.32 −2.26** −0.23 −0.06 0.01
CASH 0.24 0.24 0.62 0.79 −1.41 1.89*
0.15 0.13 0.16 0.99 −2.18** 1.67*
LEV 1.94 0.46 1.67* −0.36 −0.73 −0.42
0.33 0.34 0.40 3.04*** 3.79*** −0.34
RE −263.84 −2.95 −1.18 −0.94 0.88 −0.93
−1.52 −0.42 −4.40*** −4.75*** −6.23*** −1.00
Altman's Z −365.52 5.85 −1.20 −0.53 −0.71 −0.46
0.71 2.47 −3.55*** −2.45** −2.89*** −0.32
Note: The dollar amount for market value of equity (MVE) and total assets (Assets) have been converted to 2015 
constant dollar terms. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Levels analysis
Table 3 shows firms going public through the backdoor are relatively small in size, with a mean 
(median) market capitalisation of $67.6m ($17.2m) and total assets of $79.3m ($19.8m) by the end 
of the first financial year after listing. Compared with the matched IPO sample, BDL firms have a 
significantly lower median MVE (at the 5 per cent level) in year 1, which persists into the second 
and third year. In terms of total assets, firms from the two samples are not statistically different in 
both the mean and median value of ASSETS in the first year. This suggests we have a reasonable 
matching of BDL and IPO firms in terms of total assets. In year 2 after listing, the BDL sample 
exhibits a significantly smaller median value of ASSETS than the IPO sample, but the difference 
disappears in the third year after listing.
12
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Based on median values, all eight performance measures of the BDL firms (column 1) are 
consistently lower than those of the matched IPO firms (column 2). This indicates BDL firms 
generally have lower growth potential and are less profitable, less liquid, and more financially 
stressed than their IPO counterparts. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test of difference in median 
values (column 3) confirms that in the first year post-listing, all of the operating performance 
measures, except for LEV, are significantly different (two-tailed test) at the 1 per cent level. 
In year 2 after listing, the median value of all but the CASH and LEV measures are significantly 
different between the two groups. In year 3, BDL firms are significantly lower than the IPO 
control sample in terms of MTB, NPM, RE and Altman’s Z-score only but not the other measures. 
Overall, BDL firms seem to have underperformed their IPO counterparts consistently on 
growth potential (MTB), profitability measures (ROA, ROE and NPM), retained earnings (RE) 
and financial distress measure (Altman’s Z-score). The only favourable sign is they tend to be 
comparable with their IPO counterparts in terms of leverage (all three years) and balance sheet 
liquidity (in years 2 and 3), consistent with relatively more capital raising activity conducted by 
BDL firms in subsequent years.
Year-on-year changes
We conduct additional tests to investigate the year-on-year changes in these accounting 
measures over time. Results from Table 3 (column 4) show in the second year post-listing for the 
BDL sample, the change in both ROA and ROE, though still negative, is no longer significant at 
conventional levels. Moreover, the change in NPM becomes positive and statistically significant 
(at the 1 per cent level). BDL firms are experiencing an increase in LEV and a deteriorating 
RE and Altman’s Z-score. In year 3, except for a significant increase in LEV and worsening 
RE and financial distress measure, no significant decline in the other operating measures can 
be detected.
Compared with their BDL counterparts, IPO firms tend to exhibit a different pattern of changes 
in operating performance. Column 5 of Table 3 reveals that in both the second and third year 
of operations, IPO firms suffer a significant drop in ROA and ROE, increase in leverage, and a 
worsening accumulated losses and Altman’s Z-score measure. There is also a significant drop in 
balance sheet liquidity, which is not seen in the BDL sample. This declining trend in ROA, ROE 
and CASH is in contrast to the trend observed for the BDL firms. In column 6, we report results 
for testing differences in the year-on-year change in accounting measures between the BDL 
and IPO control firms. The only statistically discernible difference is the improvement in balance 
sheet liquidity for the BDL sample relative to the IPO firms in both years 2 and 3. This is again 
consistent with the findings that BDL firms are more active in accessing the equity market for 
capital in the post-listing years.
In sum, results from Table 3 show BDL firms underperform in terms of operating measures in 
the aftermarket when compared to the IPO control firms. Nevertheless, evidence also suggests 
the operating performance of BDL firms tends to improve (or at least stop deteriorating) over 
longer horizons, as compared to their IPO counterparts. The year-on-year results are in contrast 
to those reported by Gleason et al. (2006), which indicate a continued significant decline in ROA, 
ROE and balance sheet liquidity of US reverse takeover firms over the two years after going 
public. One implication of our results is that the poorer operating performance of the BDL firms 
in the years post-listing is partly a reflection of the performance gap that exists at the time of 
going public. Judging from the year-on-year changes, the operating performance of IPO firms 
deteriorates more than that of the BDL firms in the aftermarket.
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Survival status
We report the long-run survival status of the BDL and IPO sample firms in Table 4. Within the 
three-year period after listing, the same number (19 or 7.6 per cent) of BDL and matched IPO 
firms were de-listed from the official list of ASX. A breakdown of the reasons for de-listing 
indicates one firm from each of the two groups was taken private, three (two) of the BDLs (IPOs) 
de-listed were related to financial distress, with the remaining de-listing cases occurring following 
compulsory acquisition by or merger through a scheme of arrangement with other firms. This is 
in sharp contrast to Adjei et al. (2008), who report a de-listing rate of 31 per cent (4 per cent) by 
the end of the 12-month and 43 per cent (27 per cent) by the end of the 36-month period (for 
negative reasons) from their US reverse mergers (IPO) sample. The evidence seems to suggest 
the more stringent regulatory requirement for backdoor listing on the ASX has resulted in a lower 
failure rate in terms of de-listing from the exchange.
TABLE 4: Survival status of BDL and matched IPO firms





















Panel A: BDL firms
De-listed 2 8 9 19 2 0.8% 10 4.0% 19 7.6%
Acquired 1 6 8 15 1 0.4% 7 2.8% 15 6.0%
RTO 0 2 3 5 0 0.0% 2 0.8% 5 2.0%
Administrator/
receiver
4 3 7 14 4 1.6% 7 2.8% 14 5.6%
Going concern 61 74 83 218 61 24.3% 98 39.0% 120 47.8%
Distressed 118 130 124 372 118 47.0% 160 63.7% 183 72.9%
Panel B: Matched IPO firms
De-listed 0 7 12 19 0 0.0% 7 2.8% 19 7.6%
Acquired 2 8 13 23 2 0.8% 10 4.0% 23 9.2%
RTO 0 4 8 12 0 0.0% 4 1.6% 12 4.8%
Administrator/
receiver
3 3 6 12 3 1.2% 6 2.4% 12 4.8%
Going concern 46 55 52 153 46 18.3% 75 29.9% 90 35.9%
Distressed 72 83 83 238 72 28.7% 107 42.6% 129 51.4%
Notes: De-listed means being removed from the official register of ASX. Acquired is taken over by another company. 
RTO is reverse takeover. Administrator/receiver is when firms are under voluntary administration or receivership. 
Going concern is a qualified or modified audit opinion as to the continuation of a firm as a going concern. Distressed 
is financial distress based on a firm’s Altman’s Z-score falling below 1.81.
BDL firms seem to have a lower tendency than their IPO counterparts to be targeted in mergers 
and acquisitions activity. A total of 15 BDLs, versus 23 matched IPOs, were acquired in takeovers 
in the first three years. We note all the BDLs that were taken over proceeded to compulsory 
acquisition and de-listing while only 16 out of the 23 IPOs acquired did so. The higher rate of 
IPOs being takeover targets may indicate they are higher quality firms or in possession of more 
attractive assets than firms that went public through the back door. This conjecture seems to 
be supported by further data analysis which reveals the subsample of IPOs being taken over 
has higher profitability (ROA, ROE and NPM) and growth potential (MTB) than the subsample 
of BDLs acquired, both in terms of mean and median measures, though no formal statistical 
significance has been assessed because of the small sample size. IPO firms are also more active 
on the reverse takeover front, with 12 of them being targeted as shells in backdoor listings as 
compared with only five from the BDL sample.
We also examine how well firms survive in terms of their financial health in the aftermarket. 
A clear sign of financial trouble is when an administrator or receiver is appointed to a firm 
or its subsidiaries. In this regard, a total of 14 (or 5.6 per cent) cases from the BDL sample, in 
contrast to 12 (or 4.8 per cent) cases from the IPO control sample, were under administration 
or receivership at some point in time during the three-year period. Firms that are not under 
administration may still be subject to financial distress to various extents. Within the three years 
after listing, there were 120 (or 47.8 per cent) and 90 (or 35.9 per cent) unique firms in the BDL 
and IPO sample, respectively, which received at least one going concern qualification from 
auditors.6 In terms of the total number of qualifications, the BDL sample has an aggregate of 
14
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218 instances, while the IPO sample has 153. As another indicator of financial trouble, we follow 
Altman (1968) and classify firms with a Z-score of below 1.81 as being under distress. Table 4 
shows a total of 183 (or 72.9 per cent) BDL firms fell under this category, as compared with 129 
(or 51.4 per cent) firms in the matched IPO sample. Overall, the evidence tends to suggest a 
larger proportion of BDL firms are under financial distress than their IPO counterparts.
Stock market performance
As our last performance measure in the aftermarket, we examine buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs) of backdoor-listed firms. Following Ritter (1991), Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) 
and others in the literature, long-run holding-period returns are calculated for each firm for up 
to three years (36 months) after the completion of the BDL transaction. Three performance 
benchmarks are employed for computing the BHARs. These benchmarks represent the 
corresponding holding-period returns on (1) the matched IPO firms, (2) the SPPR value-weighted 
market index or VMI, and (3) the SPPR equal-weighted market index or EMI. For each BDL 
firm i, the buy-and-hold abnormal return (benchmark-adjusted) for each holding interval T in 
the post-listing period is calculated as the difference between its buy-and-hold return and the 









( BtBt-1 ) ,
where Pi,t is the closing stock price of firm i in month t, Bt is the closing price of the benchmark 
in month t, and T is the duration of the holding period ranging from 1 to 36 months after listing. 
Note that the matched IPO benchmark would be subject to the same missing observation 
problem as their BDL peers, but the two market-wide benchmarks are not affected.7 To compute 
an average buy-and-hold abnormal return across the sample of BDL firms, we employ both 
an equal-weighed (EW) scheme and a value-weighted (VW) scheme based on the market 
capitalisation of the BDL firms at the time of going public.
Figures 1 and 2 plot, respectively, the EW and VW long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
for the BDL firms in the sample. One striking pattern revealed is that all three measures of 
BHARs are predominantly negative over the three-year period, except perhaps for the first six 
(EW) and 15 (VW) months against the matched IPO benchmark. Benchmarking against the 
matched IPO sample and the EMI produces the least and most negative returns, respectively, 
with the VMI-adjusted BHARs lying in between. Specifically, by the end of the 36-month 
period, the equal-weighted BHARs are −22.9 per cent, −67.0 per cent and −86.1 per cent and 
the value-weighted BHARs are −13.4 per cent, −49.0 per cent and −65.0 per cent against 
the matched IPO, VMI and EMI benchmarks, respectively. Recall that the IPO control sample 
is constructed by matching on year, industry and size. In addition, both BDL and IPO firms 
represent firms that are newly listed. Thus a smaller BHAR would be expected using matched 
IPO firms as a control. Holding-period returns for the EMI are tilted towards smaller firms because 
of the equal-weighted scheme used. Due to the survivorship problem inherent in constructing 
market indices, the return on the EMI would tend to be biased upward, making it a tougher 
benchmark to beat. VMI, on the other hand, would be dominated by larger firms and so the 
benchmark return would tend to be more moderate.
FIGURE 1: Equal-weighted average buy-and-hold abnormal returns of backdoor-listed firms
Months after backdoor listing















1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35
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FIGURE 2: Value-weighted average buy-and-hold abnormal returns of backdoor-listed firms
Months after backdoor listing
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Note: Value weights are based on the market capitalisation of backdoor-listed firms at time of going public.
To ascertain if BDL firms underperform their IPO control firms in terms of buy-and-hold returns, 
we test if the BHARs (IPO adjusted) by the end of 12, 24 and 36 months are significantly different 
from zero. Table 5, which reports test results (two-tailed tests) on both the mean and median 
weighted BHARs, reveals all but the mean 12-month value-weighted BHAR are negative in sign. 
Tests of sample means indicate the equal-weighted BHAR is significantly different from zero 
for the 24-month (at the 1 per cent level) and 36-month (at the 10 per cent level) holding period 
while the value-weighted BHAR is only marginally significant (at the 10 per cent level) for the 
24-month holding period only. On the other hand, median tests suggest BHARs are significantly 
different from zero for both equal- and value-weighted measures and for all three holding 
periods. These test results are, however, inconsistent with Gleason et al. (2006) who essentially 
find no significant difference in mean and median buy-and-hold returns between reverse 
takeover firms and IPO control firms in the US market. We interpret our results as evidence 
of long-run underperformance of Australian BDL firms relative to the matched IPO sample.8 
Yet, there are also signs that the negative trend of the BHARs has started to reverse or, at least, 
level off towards the last six months of the three-year period.
TABLE 5: Tests of underperformance of long-run BHARs (matched IPO-adjusted) of 
backdoor-listed firms
Equal-weighted BHARs Value-weighted BHARs
Holding 
period
N Mean Median t-test Wilcoxon Z Mean Median t-test Wilcoxon Z
12-month 246 −0.040% −0.096% −1.31 −3.64***  0.009% −0.034% 0.18 −3.69***
24-month 222 −0.109% −0.032% −2.62*** −2.54** −0.086% −0.013% −1.83* −2.71***
36-month 195 −0.117% −0.050% −1.77* −3.18*** −0.069% −0.019% −0.83 −3.61***
Note: The BHARs reported are the sample mean and median based on the distribution of equal- and value-weighted 
returns of individual firms. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Conclusion
Despite a very similar regulatory process for both backdoor and front-door listings in Australia, 
we document significant long-run underperformance for a sample of non-financial BDL relative 
to a controlled sample of IPO firms. Specifically, backdoor-listed firms tend to raise less equity 
capital and be less profitable and more financially distressed than their IPO peers. They also 
exhibit negative buy-and-hold returns when benchmarked against the matched IPO firms and 
broad-based market indices. This finding is not consistent with the assertion in the literature that 
lax regulatory oversight is the major culprit for the underperformance of backdoor-listed firms in 
the aftermarket. Nevertheless, our results suggest the negative image associated with backdoor 
listings may seem justified.
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Despite a very similar regulatory process for both backdoor and front-door listings 
in Australia, we document significant long-run underperformance for a sample of 
non-financial BDL relative to a controlled sample of IPO firms. Specifically, backdoor-
listed firms tend to raise less equity capital and be less profitable and more financially 
distressed than their IPO peers. They also exhibit negative buy-and-hold returns 
when benchmarked against the matched IPO firms and broad-based market indices. 
This finding is not consistent with the assertion in the literature that lax regulatory 
oversight is the major culprit for the underperformance of backdoor-listed firms in 
the aftermarket. Nevertheless, our results suggest the negative image associated with 
backdoor listings may seem justified.
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Notes
1.  ‘ASIC raises red flag over “mining to tech” backdoor’, by Tess Ingram published in the Australian Financial Review 
on 31 July 2014.
2.  See, for example, ‘Record numbers queuing up for backdoor listings’ by Nick Abrahams published in the Australian 
Financial Review on 30 September 2014 and ‘Tech backdoor listings surge but investor returns are mixed’ by 
Yolanda Redrup published in the Australian Financial Review on 25 May 2015.
3.  There are a few instances in which we cannot match a BDL firm with an IPO firm from the same industry sector. 
In such cases, we broaden the definition of industry sectors and collapse all the non-financial sectors into 
extractives and industrials only.
4.  All amounts are expressed in millions of dollars, deflated to 2015 constant dollar terms using the Consumer Price 
Index (all capital cities) published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
5.  There was one matched IPO firm which did not involve any public offer of shares at the time of going public.
6.  For the purposes of auditor’s going concern opinion, a qualified opinion and ‘emphasis of matter’, which explicitly 
makes reference to a going concern uncertainty, are treated as the same.
7.  The number of firms included for calculating holding-period returns may vary over time. Firms may be excluded 
for a certain month because of suspension of trading by ASX or if they do not have a valid price due to a lack of 
trading. Where a BDL firm de-lists before its IPO control firm does prior to the end of the event window, we drop 
both firms from the calculation of average portfolio BHAR from the de-listing month onwards, and similarly if an 
IPO control firm de-lists before its corresponding BDL firm does. We note any portfolio of BDLs that we form does 
not represent an implementable investment strategy as the timing of the BDL transactions is widely dispersed in 
calendar time throughout the sample period.
8.  One caveat of the results in Figure 1 and 2 is that the BHARs only provide a direct measure of ‘investor experience’ 
of investing in backdoor-listed firms. They are nonetheless subject to the bad-model problem as discussed by 
Fama (1998). To the extent that the IPO firm matching approach does not sufficiently control for all systematic risk 
factors in stock returns, the finding of long-run underperformance of BDL firms could be spurious.
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